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It is untrue to say our politicians cannot agree on anything, for they agree that the election of May 7 2015 will be 
the most important in a generation. In keeping with our fiercely partisan politics, each has distinct reasons for 
believing that to be the case.
Most also agree that one of the most urgent requirements of those who scrap for votes – currently and in the 
future – is a better understanding of how race and culture now impacts on the British electoral process. Once 
they had a working knowledge. But with fast moving demographic re-alignment in towns, cities and hamlets 
around the country, the tectonic plates are shifting. Around them they see ties loosening, traditions eroding, 
certainties unravelling. 
With ethnic minorities projected to make up a quarter or more of Britain’s population by 2051, compared with 
8% in 2001, the parties do understand that new thinking is required; not just by those that wish to represent, but 
by those who aspire to form governments and municipal administrations. They know that the need to grasp new 
realities is greater than ever. And yet - here is the oddity - none can really be said to have risen to what could 
become a life-or-death challenge. The loser on May 8 may rue that failure as an opportunity squandered.
Talk to Labour officials and they will emphasise the importance of the party continuing to appeal to the majority of 
Britain’s voting minorities. These are ties going back over a half a century and replicated down generations. 
But they will know of grassroots disgruntlement that the relationship has been left untended. The party promises 
that if elected in May, it would enact a radical plan to tackle race inequality. But in the interim there are concerns 
that Miliband’s Labour has done too little to address the specific problems of traditionally supportive minorities for 
fear of losing more support among white working class communities. Concerns that the party has been reluctant 
to boost minority representation within parliament with the same determination that led to the increase of more 
female Labour MPs via all women shortlists. In April, Diane Abbott warned her party that the Conservatives are on 
their way to overtaking Labour when it comes to electing more black and Asian MPs. 
Labour faces questions connected with the pronounced shift of minorities from inner cities into the suburbs.  
Will those who supported Labour maintain that allegiance, or will they absorb the outlooks of neighbours who 
might support other parties?
The Conservatives also have much thinking to do. The Tories secured just 16% of the minority vote in 2010. 
In a time of political plenty, such underperformance was regrettable, no more. But with the shrinking of the 
traditional Tory vote reservoir in white, middle England and the projected demographic shift of minorities into Tory 
heartlands, party bosses understand that their position is not sustainable. 
Are minorities conservative? Many, many are. The pollster Lord Ashcroft and others have produced research 
showing the relative extent to which some minority communities are more likely to connect with the Tory message 
than others. The key problem for the party is branding. In the years of political plenty, it didn’t matter numerically 
that the Tories presented as uncomfortable and hostile to diversity. It carried the millstone of Enoch Powell’s Rivers 
of Blood speech - despite Powell’s immediate dismissal by Edward Heath. There was the campaign in Smethwick 
in the 1964 General Election, with its unofficial slogan “If you want nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour”. There was 
the tacit approval of Thatcherite right wingers for backbenchers who would occasionally make the news with racist 
remarks. There was Thatcher herself, dog whistling with talk of Britain being “swamped” by those of alien cultures. 
Marketeers like brands. They communicate almost subliminally the form and shape and values of the product  
on offer. A positive branding endures. But so does a negative one. I once discussed this with Grant Shapps,  
the Conservative party chairman. He seemed puzzled that so few minorities felt able to embrace the Tory brand. 
I have to take my hat off to you, I told him. Given the conservative instincts of so many minorities - people who 
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exhort their own self reliance, people who revere family, church and institutions - for you to pick up so few votes 
from them is virtually an act of genius.
So the Tories have been thinking, as a sailor will think when the boat has sprung a leak. They have 18 ethnic 
minority candidates in held seats, compared - at the time of writing - with Labour’s 19. And they have been doing 
things selected minorities might like; more action regarding possible corruption on the totemic Stephen Lawrence 
case and a thorough review of stop and search by the police. A reduction in air passenger duty, allowing minority 
Britons to take cheaper flights back to south Asia and the Caribbean. Action to stop the banks moving out of the 
remittance market used by UK Somalians to send money home to their families. 
But if only it were that easy. Here’s a conundrum still baffling Tories; how to be liberal enough to negate the 
negative branding and build minority support, without appearing so liberal that they lose the middle class right and 
the white working class vote to UKIP. How to look tough on immigration without being accused of an attack on 
difference? Problems like this have been identified by the party but require attention and sustained determination 
from the top to achieve solution. Thus far, they haven’t had it.
Does this represent an opportunity for the smaller parties? Perhaps, but with the Liberal Democrats in 
retrenchment, few believe this will be the time for it to deal with a lamentable record in terms of race and front line 
political representation. It too has a branding problem; not Tory hostility - just the impression of cliquism and all 
smothering apathy. Addressing that might one day transport the party to a healthier state. 
There are competing currents. Some argue that in the politics of 21st century Britain, race matters less in terms 
of belonging and party allegiance than class. But perhaps that is the rose tinted view. And still there are specific 
communities who are communally and collectively ill served by the way we do our politics.  For them, the 
argument as to whether their disadvantage stems from race or class seems moot. 
For all that - survey the landscape, read the varied and hugely informative series of papers compiled within this 
report by the excellent Runnymede Trust - and now must strike you as a significant moment; when the votes of 
those who live outside the walls of white Middle England matter, and increasingly so. What altruism has failed to 
achieve over all these years, numbers will.
Hugh Muir, Guardian
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In an election with the greatest uncertainty of outcome 
in living memory, the different voting behaviour of 
various groups in the UK is particularly salient. In this 
volume Runnymede has gathered together influential 
academics’ analysis on the role of race, ethnicity and 
religion in this and previous elections.
For decades Black and minority ethnic (BME) voting 
patterns have not been a high priority for political 
parties and the wider public. The first BME MP 
(Dadabhai Naoroji) was voted in for the constituency 
of Finsbury Central over 120 years ago and yet there 
has been comparatively little progress in this time 
for BME politicians and voters alike. Nevertheless as 
various contributions to this volume make clear, there 
are historically important trends around the relationship 
between race, ethnicity and mainstream politics – 
notably the electoral weakness of the far right and the 
dominance of the Labour party among BME voters – 
that continue to exert significant influence over election 
outcomes, in 2015 and beyond.
In recent years the changing demographic profile  
of Britain’s BME populations has seen a significant 
shift in their importance in electoral politics for all 
parties. In particular the rate of growth in the ethnic 
minority population has been quite significant. From 
less than 5% nationally (3 million people) in 1991,  
the BME population in 2011 rose to 13% – at  
8 million, equivalent to the combined population  
of Scotland and Wales.
Of course this population is not evenly spread, 
and so does not equally affect parliamentary 
constituencies across the UK. In 1991, there were 
only 7 constituencies in which more than 40% of the 
population was Black and minority ethnic. According 
to the 2011 Census there are now 49 such seats. 
In 1992 the Conservatives could only lose 7 seats 
by failing to win over many ethnic minority voters, 
but in 2010 and beyond, the Conservatives could 
lose 50 or more such seats. This is perhaps most 
marked in London, where the Conservatives won 
a commanding majority of seats up until 1992, but 
have seen previously safe seats become marginal. In 
Margaret Thatcher’s old seat of Finchley and Golders 
Green, the BME population is now 33%. The national 
average is about 13%.
It is not just in cities such as London, Birmingham 
or Bradford, where the large BME population 
can influence who gets elected. There have been 
notable increases in suburbia and smaller university 
towns. In 1981, there were 50 seats with 15% BME 
residents. By 2011, there were 150 seats with 15% 
BME residents. Inside this 150 are seats such as 
Cambridge, Halifax, and Richmond Park (all 18%). 
Seats such as Beaconsfield, Gloucester, Ipswich, 
Cheadle, and Leamington and Warwick are just 
outside the 150 (all around 12%). For comparison 
of scale, the Labour Party target list for the 2015 
General Election is 106 seats. The Conservative Party 
strategy for the 2015 General Election is to hold 40 
marginals while gaining 40 marginals.
Furthermore, there are fewer seats where BME 
voters have no impact at all on election outcomes. 
As recently as 2001, around half of all seats had a 
BME population of under 3%; in 2011 the equivalent 
seat had a BME population of 5-6%. These might 
not seem like large proportions, but in marginal 
seats with majorities in the thousands or hundreds, 
the BME vote will increasingly influence outcomes: 
Operation Black Vote research shows that there are 
now 167 seats where the BME population exceeds 
the current MP’s majority. Estimates also suggest 
that the rural BME population will double by 2050.
The increasing dispersal of the BME population 
is matched and partly driven by the increasing 
diversity within the BME population. While the 
2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study showed 
that the larger ethnic minority groups continued to 
disproportionately (68%) support Labour, there were 
some signs of differences among some populations 
(notably middle-class Indians). The impact of more 
recent migrants is only beginning to be felt electorally.
What, then, are the parties doing about this? In the 
2010 party manifestos, there was only one mention 
of race and race equality – a Liberal Democrat 
commitment to name-blind CVs, lost in the coalition 
bargaining. Under the coalition, race and race 
equality have not been directly addressed, and has 
even been rolled back, although we have of course 
witnessed the rise of immigration as arguably the 
most politically salient issue.
Introduction: Race and Elections 
in 2015 and Beyond
Omar Khan
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Across the Atlantic, Barack Obama’s success in 
building a winning coalition including large majorities 
of the rising ethnic minority vote has seen the 
Republicans reach out again, especially to Latino 
voters, to neutralise what might become an inbuilt 
Democratic electoral advantage. Those familiar with 
Canada will know that right-of-centre politicians have 
done much better in appealing to the children and 
grandchildren of immigrants.
While demographic change in the UK has been 
notable for a decade now, it has taken some time 
for political parties to catch up to this change. A key 
reason for this is that BME people compose a smaller 
share of the electorate than they do of the overall 
population, mainly because of the relatively younger 
age of BME residents in Britain, but also because of 
their lower registration rates and entitlement to vote 
among some overseas citizens.
This lag in the full impact of BME voting power will 
soon change. Among the 60+ population, only 5% 
are BME, but of those under 18 over 20% are BME. 
By 2020, 10% of the 60-64 population will be BME, 
and nearly 20% of those 40 and under. 
Partly in response to change, the Conservatives 
have dramatically increased their number of ethnic 
minority MPs and candidates in winnable seats, 
meaning that they will more or less match Labour’s 
total in 2015 from a base of none before 2005. For 
the 2015 General Election, the three major parties 
made significantly greater commitments to addressing 
racial inequalities, or otherwise appealing to ethnic 
minority voters, in their respective manifestos than 
they had done in 2010. However, the Conservatives’ 
proposals are relatively limited, restricted to proposing 
an increase in the numbers of Black and minority 
ethnic police officers, albeit through new recruitment 
schemes which don’t appear to target minorities.
The Liberal Democrat manifesto goes considerably 
further, with proposals to enact the remaining 
unimplemented clauses of the 2010 Equality Act, to 
promote BAME entrepreneurship, and to monitor 
and tackle the BAME pay gap – although there 
is no mention of the BAME employment gap. It 
also proposes to tackle discrimination and ethnic 
inequalities within the criminal justice system and 
policing. The Labour Party on the other hand has 
produced a separate BAME manifesto which makes 
a wider range of commitments, including proposals 
for a cross-government race equality strategy as 
well as measures on the pay gap, long-term youth 
unemployment and hate crimes. It also refers to the 
need for the police and judiciary to represent the 
communities they serve, though the document is 
somewhat lacking in detail on how they will achieve 
all these objectives. It remains to be seen whether 
these commitments will be enough to convince 
BME voters in 2015, and whether these are the key 
concerns for the next generation of BME voters.
As with all voters, BME voters are motivated by 
their political attitudes and values. While many such 
attitudes are shared across ethnicity, two issues 
are distinctive for ethnic minority voters. First is that 
unemployment is a particularly notable concern, a 
fact that is less surprising given the higher rates and 
future risk of unemployment among all BME groups, 
from 16 year old NEETs to Oxbridge graduates to 
currently employed professionals. Second, all BME 
groups suggest they still feel racism affects their life 
chances, with over a third of Black Caribbean people 
reporting a personal experience of discrimination.
This explains the focus in many contributors on 
discrimination and the continued effects of past 
party political responses to it. Furthermore, there 
are concerns that Islamophobia has passed what 
Baroness Warsi called the ‘dinner table test’, and 
that anti-immigration rhetoric can allow for wider 
questioning about the place of Black and minority 
ethnic people in the UK. In response to these 
concerns, Runnymede organised an academic forum 
meeting at the University of Manchester at which 
Stephen Ashe, Nigel Copsey and Rob Ford presented 
papers that were adapted for their contributions to 
this volume. Given the upcoming election, we felt it 
was important to gather further contributions from 
the leading UK academics to ensure that media and 
political party discussions on race and elections was 
informed by the evidence. This evidence indicates 
continuities with the past, as well as significant social 
change among the increasingly diverse Black and 
minority ethnic population in Britain. 
All the parties need to reconsider their strategies to 
respond this change, and whether their previous or 
current policies will be a barrier or incentive for BME 
voters in 2015 and beyond. Whatever the parties’ 
respective strategies for winning as many seats as 
possible in the uncertain election of 2015, if they wait 
till 2020 to develop a plan for the various Black and 
minority ethnic groups living across the UK, it may be 
too late.
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Nuffield College, Oxford and University of Manchester
It is well known that ethnic minorities tend to support 
Labour in much the way that the traditional working 
class used to support Labour back in the 1950s 
and 1960s, providing Labour with its safest seats. 
Nowadays many of the safest Labour seats, such as 
Stephen Timms’ seat of East Ham, have very large 
ethnic minority populations. At the 2010 General 
Election ethnic minorities made up around two-thirds 
of the East Ham electorate, and Stephen Timms won 
70% of the vote for Labour.
However, minorities are not a monolithic Labour-
supporting bloc vote which can be delivered 
automatically at every general election. There are 
considerable differences between ethnic minorities, 
with voters of Black African or Black Caribbean 
background showing the highest levels of support for 
Labour. Voters with roots in Bangladesh or Pakistan 
have been somewhat less inclined to vote Labour, 
and at the 2010 general election around a quarter 
of the voters of Pakistani background supported 
the Liberal Democrats, almost certainly reflecting 
Muslims’ unease about the Labour Party’s support 
for the military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
And Britain’s largest ethnic minority – the Indians (and 
particularly those from East Africa) – are the minority 
most likely to be supportive of the Conservatives. But 
even voters of Indian background gave only a quarter 
of their votes at the 2010 general election to the 
Conservatives compared with 61% voting Labour,  
a lead for Labour of 37 points – far larger than 
Labour’s lead in the working class.
This support for Labour, rather like that of the 
traditional working class in the 1950s and 1960s, 
does not appear to be rooted in preferences for 
specific Labour policies (or opposition to specific 
Conservative ones). Rather it appears to be based 
on the general, and largely accurate, perception that 
Labour has in the past been the party most likely to 
protect minority interests, whereas the Conservatives 
in contrast are not seen as a party which is especially 
interested in helping minorities.
This shared perception that Labour is the party 
most likely to look after ethnic minority interests is 
grounded on the historical record. All the legislation 
passed by Parliament to protect minorities 
against racial discrimination and to promote their 
opportunities within Britain have been passed under 
Labour governments. This applies to the 1965, 
1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts, the 2000 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act, the 2006 Racial 
and Religious hatred Act, and the 2010 Equality 
Act, all enacted under Labour administrations. The 
1998 Human Rights Act, passed under a Labour 
government, is also often seen as an act which has 
helped minorities. Many of these acts were opposed 
by sections of the Conservative party, and the 
Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto promised to repeal the 
1998 Human Rights Act (and to replace it with a UK 
Bill of rights). In contrast, Conservative governments 
have more often introduced legislation to restrict 
access to British citizenship and to make more difficult 
migration from the countries where Britain’s main 
minorities have their roots. One important exception 
should be noted, however. The Conservatives under 
Edward Heath did grant entry to Britain for the East 
African Asians when they were expelled from Uganda 
by Idi Amin in 1972. It is not perhaps coincidental that 
these East African Asians are the group nowadays 
most likely to support the Conservatives.
However, minority support for Labour cannot be 
taken for granted. This was shown very clearly by 
the Respect Party. In 2005 George Galloway, who 
had been expelled from the Labour party for his 
strident opposition to the Iraq war, won the Bethnal 
Green and Bow constituency, and subsequently and 
sensationally overturned a safe Labour majority at the 
Bradford West by-election in 2012. More generally 
there is something of a tension between minorities’ 
support for Labour at the ballot box and their policy 
preferences on specific issues (such as the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan), a tension which gives the 
possibility of a realignment of voting patterns.
This tension is not limited to divergences with 
Labour’s former policies on Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In fact, the policy agendas of minorities are not as 
distinctively left-wing as might be expected. On 
the classic issue of cutting taxes versus increasing 
spending on health and social services, for example, 
all the main ethnic minority groups are actually more 
1. Ethnic Minorities at  
the Ballot Box
Anthony Heath
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in favour of cutting taxes than is the electorate as a 
whole, with the South Asian groups being particularly 
distant from Labour’s policies. Furthermore, on other 
topics like immigration there are large differences 
between the different minorities, with Indians being 
notable for their lack of support for high rates of 
immigration.
More generally, many members of ethnic minorities 
resemble the ‘aspirational’ voters whom the 
Conservative party has often successfully appealed 
to, and whom New Labour set out to woo with their 
move towards the centre of the political spectrum. 
So although minorities might look like traditional 
working-class Labour supporters if we look only at 
their voting patterns, more detailed examination of 
their policy preferences suggest that they have much 
more in common with the aspiring, upwardly mobile 
voters whom New Labour set out to win.
Migrants themselves are rarely representative of 
the population in their country of origin. Indeed, the 
more difficult it is to migrate, the more distinctive 
the migrant tends to be in terms of resourcefulness, 
drive and ambition from those who stayed behind 
in the country of origin. In the jargon of economics, 
migrants tend to be ‘positively selected’, and there 
is considerable evidence now that migrants from 
China, India, and parts of Africa are very highly 
selected (whereas migrants from Europe, for whom 
it is much easier to come to Britain, are more likely 
to be typical of their country of origin). Since many 
migrants found their opportunities to progress in 
Britain were blocked by lack of language skills or by 
racial discrimination, their aspirations have often been 
transferred to their children – and we indeed find that 
the children of migrants tend to have higher levels of 
educational aspiration and are more likely to progress 
to university than are their white British peers from 
similar social class origins.
It is probably fair to say then that minorities – both 
the migrants and their children – in many respects 
are aspirational voters eager for social mobility, if 
not for themselves then for their children. Many will 
also be employed in the private sector or be self-
employed, and relatively few are members of Trades 
Unions – although once again this will vary between 
as well as within minorities.
Some commentators have even suggested that 
ethnic minorities have a ‘natural affinity’ with the 
Conservative party, but offsetting these affinities are 
two divergences with other policy areas. First of all, 
minorities tend to be much less interested in the 
European question than are the white British. This 
probably tells us more about the kind of white people 
who are exercised about Europe than it does about 
minorities: European integration tends to be an issue 
which worries older generations, brought up at a time 
when Britain still had an empire and thought of itself 
as a world power. So the anti-European messages 
emanating from UKIP and the Euro-sceptic wing of 
the Conservative party are not likely to have much 
positive appeal to minority voters.
Second, and perhaps most important, all ethnic 
minority groups share a concern to be offered equal 
opportunities in British society. There is little evidence 
that minorities want special treatment to make up 
for a history of discrimination in the way that some 
African Americans do. There is absolutely no appetite 
among British ethnic minorities for quotas or for 
‘positive discrimination’. Rather, minorities in Britain 
want to achieve educational and economic success 
for themselves and their children on their own merits. 
It is a desire for a level playing field, an archetypal 
British concern. Any party which shows an appetite 
for trying to make a reality of the British dream of 
equality of opportunity is likely to find a receptive 
audience among ethnic minorities.
Further reading
Many of the topics briefly covered here are dealt with 
in greater depth in:
Heath, Anthony F, Stephen Fisher, Gemma 
Rosenblatt, David Sanders and Maria 
Sobolewska (2013) The Political Integration of 
Ethnic Minorities in Britain. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.
Heath, Anthony F and Yael Brinbaum (eds) 
(2014) Unequal Attainments: Ethnic Educational 
Inequalities in Ten Western Countries. Proceedings  
of the British Academy 196. Oxford: OUP for the 
British Academy.
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The bulk of South Asian, African and Caribbean 
origin Britons trace their British roots to a time in the 
mid to late twentieth century. This is when either they, 
or their parents, or their grandparents, made the trek 
to Britain as permanent settlers. Britain was a rather 
different country then: it was awash with strong anti-
immigrant public sentiment, early prospects for the 
newcomers were challenging at best, their potential 
contribution to society was scarcely noticed, and 
the country’s major political parties reacted with 
indifference or arrogance.
Contesting the past
The period between the 1964 Smethwick episode 
and the 1968 Kenyan Asian crisis and the outspoken 
warnings of Enoch Powell, set the tone. Mainstream 
parties saw black and brown immigrants as a way 
to gather votes cheaply – ensuring that immigrants 
were viewed and discussed as the sources of social 
problems. First impressions counted in the minds 
of the immigrants and have contributed to a bitter 
legacy as a result.
British domestic party politics has undoubtedly 
been shaped by the legacy of Powell in the half 
century since. On the right, Conservative nationalists 
and social authoritarians have been influential and 
have clung onto a ‘myth of invitation’ argument. 
Since much of the immigration from the New 
Commonwealth had not been the product of explicit 
government policy, let alone endorsed by parliament, 
Powellites asserted that the migrants were and would 
remain an illegitimate presence. Older generations of 
voters on the right have thus tended to be prepared 
to tolerate – guardedly and at a distance – the ethnic 
diversity brought by mass immigration whilst not 
accepting its basis. 
This has left open the opportunity to contest the 
past, itself a deeply divisive signal. Conservative 
liberal modernisers have thus had to address fears 
about the pace of cultural change as well as lingering 
grievances about its validity.
Meanwhile, for the Labour Party and the left, mass 
immigration has given rise to a substantial set of 
arguments about the limits of cultural pluralism and 
impacts on national cohesion. The left has mostly 
enjoyed the electoral backing of New Commonwealth 
immigrants and their offspring, leading, in some 
places, to a heavy reliance on these voters and even 
voting blocs. Labour’s core challenge has been to 
embed itself as the natural party of ethnic minorities 
much in the same way that it was once thought of as 
the natural party for, and of, the working class. 
Electorally speaking, the task of successive Tories in 
appealing to migrants has been an uphill task from 
the outset. The party’s motives, character and history 
are quickly dragged up, with a suggestion that the 
Conservatives have not done enough to repudiate 
their Powellite past. Writing in the run-up to the 2015 
General Election, Rob Ford, a widely respected 
follower on the parties’ fortunes in appealing to 
migrant voters, concluded that: 
The first wave of migrants who arrived in Britain 
in the 1950s and 1960s have never forgotten the 
hostility stoked in particular by Enoch Powell and 
his allies in the Conservative Party, nor the passage 
by the Labour Party of the first wave of anti-
discrimination legislation. The fierce arguments of the 
period forged an image of the parties in these voters’ 
minds, with Labour then seen as the party which 
protects migrant and minority interests in contrast 
to the Conservatives. This image has survived to the 
present, and even been passed to second and third 
generation ethnic minority voters with no memory of 
the period when it was formed. (Ford, 2015) 
Binary political choices
The party system itself poorly reflects and even 
distorts the nature of political choice facing ethnic 
minorities. This is because, as subsequent generations 
of ethnic minorities have become established, the 
factual picture describing their circumstances and 
outlooks has become ever-more heterogeneous. 
Meanwhile, parties mostly view minorities through 
homogenising spectacles, loosely equating ethnicity 
with disadvantage or exclusion of some kind.
Black and brown minorities occupy a broad 
spectrum of social, economic and cultural positions. 
2. Ethnic Minorities and Political 
Parties: Challenges and Dilemmas
Shamit Saggar
University of Essex
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A compelling evidence base points to Indians and 
Chinese groups in general pulling ahead of most 
other minorities in educational and employment 
terms. However, the increasing educational success 
of all minority groups, through compulsory school 
attainment and higher education participation rates 
in particular, which now stand comfortably above 
the national average. Within all groups – though 
more notably among Indian and Chinese Britons 
– there are groups with rising levels of material 
prosperity, widening of occupational and social 
circles, increasing levels of residential dispersal, and 
an increase in marriage across ethnic lines. Yet all 
groups struggle to convert their educational success 
into commensurate employment outcomes, and all 
still have higher rates of unemployment, particularly 
for Black Caribbean, Black African, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi people. While all groups affirm a British 
identity, on some attitudinal measures or in terms 
of marriage across ethnic lines some groups have 
lower rates of integration as well as reduced entry 
into recognised routes of progression, although there 
is some evidence of recent accelerated gains for 
Bangladeshis in Britain.
Political parties have generally not been alive to 
this layered and nuanced picture. Their reticence 
or discomfort is doubly frustrating because 
the signature lesson of party leadership and 
management in Britain in the past twenty years has 
been the enormous degree to which parties have 
managed, and accepted the need, to reach beyond 
their traditional base. Labour and the Tories have fully 
grasped the idea that voters in general are arranged 
along a series of overlapping continuums that reflect 
inter alia socio-economic realities, personal aspiration 
and social attitudes. In other words, there is every 
reason not to appeal to voters as members of two 
discrete, static camps. And yet this out-dated, 
binary logic remains cast in concrete in respect to 
campaigns to attract minority voters – due, in the 
main, to a sense that race remains an electoral  
trump card.
Westminster: the cockpit 
of democracy
If ethnic minority voters have been only partially 
integrated into British mass electoral democracy, 
what can be said about the function of political 
parties in political recruitment to Westminster and 
in shaping access to executive office? The picture 
here is rather better in that party membership and 
candidacy increasingly reflect a broader distribution 
of political attitudes and preferences.
Britain elected its first cohort of ethnic minority MPs 
in modern times in the mid 1980s. This all-Labour 
group was spawned from a then-strong alignment 
between the party’s hard left factions committed to 
tackling structural inequalities and the ambitions of 
a rising second generation of minority politicians. 
Thereafter Labour’s tightened it grip on minority 
representation at Westminster for more than fifteen 
years, giving rise to an impression of a natural affinity 
with Labour accompanied by a stand-off-ish posture 
by their Tory rivals. The breakthrough for the Tories 
came a full decade later, and even then only a small 
trickle of black and Asians got as far as Westminster. 
A particular pattern stood out early on whereby 
minority elected representation was overwhelmingly 
channelled into areas of relatively high ethnic minority 
residential and voter concentration. An obvious 
colour-coding of constituencies was at play: minority 
hopefuls focused on their chances in these seats; 
such seats tended to be Labour strongholds thus 
carrying big prizes for those selected; and the 
ethnically and racially-oriented concerns of minority 
electors in such places were given prominence over 
the full array of political issues. Only one Labour 
minority MP (the late Ashok Kumar) managed to defy 
this unwritten code in Middlesbrough South and East 
Cleveland. And the code was further reinforced as 
a result of concerns about the continuing electoral 
liability of ethnic minority candidates in ‘snow-
white’ constituencies. Several rows in Battersea, 
Cheltenham and elsewhere highlighted this anxiety, 
coupled with another regarding how selectors might 
favour particular groups in seats where many different 
minority groups had settled and might be competing 
for a single vacant nomination, e.g. Southall and 
Bethnal Green and Bow.
In the period from 2005 onwards the bias towards 
Labour in minority representation in parliament has 
been diluted significantly. In the 2010 general election 
in particular, the Conservatives surged both in terms 
of minorities and women who succeeded in gaining 
nominations in either safe or reasonably attractive 
seats. The Tories going into the 2015 contest are 
likely to improve in their current tally of 11, and some 
estimates suggest that, if the party were to win an 
outright parliamentary majority, this total could rise 
to 19. Given that Labour currently has 16 such MPs, 
the symbolic importance of overtaking the standard 
bearer cannot be downplayed.
The Tory catch-up, if it can be dubbed as such, 
is attributable to two main factors. First, it reflects 
the considerable effort that has been invested by 
the national party bureaucracy in professionalising 
Runnymede Perspectives10
the selection processes and practices of local 
constituency associations. This has often been viewed 
locally as unwanted interference, and alien, in what is 
after all a federally organised national political party. 
Secondly, the recruitment of a fresher, more feminine 
and black and brown cast list to fight in winnable seats 
has been an integral element of the modernisation 
tone set by the Cameron-Osborne-Hague-Maude 
quad at the helm of the party. Modernisation may have 
stalled on many occasions but it is likely to deliver an 
irreversible shift in the sociological composition of the 
party’s parliamentary wing. 
Both of these factors have not been without risks. 
Local party backlashes have occurred regularly 
signifying the disruption intended and felt. Equally, 
the direction of travel has been keenly fought over, 
 in a party that is struggling with its long post-
Thatcher legacy. 
Diversity and difference
With the convergence between the major parties’ 
ethnic composition at elite level, an old debate is 
now expected to come to the fore. This centres on: 
a) what difference will a less-white parliament result 
in? and b) how should minority MPs behave and be 
thought of politically? 
The answers to these two questions will depend on 
how the major parties address two mostly unrelated 
matters. First, issues of party discipline are likely to be 
more important in the next parliament than the current 
one. This is because winning majorities are simply 
less attainable today. Therefore, in some cases the 
ethnicity of an MP – and indeed any individual-level 
characteristic – may be cast as especially relevant in 
securing their support, particularly if standard party 
loyalties come under heavy pressure. Second, MPs’ 
division lobby behaviour on certain issues is likely to 
pose as many questions as it answers. Traditional 
bread and butter political issues such as deficit 
reduction or NHS funding can be interpreted to more 
easily address the needs of discrete population sub-
groups. So squeezes on public spending are rapidly 
viewed through the lens of ethnicity to highlight which 
groups use or are reliant on which services. Health 
service priorities also contain many potential ethnically-
related prisms.
The next parliament can, however, point in a different 
direction. Its greater ethnic diversity can be a 
powerful force to interrogate political difference by 
focusing on the overlaps and shared understandings 
that exist across ethnic lines. This principle then 
enables minority and majority ethnic group MPs to 
support tailored services and revised priorities in a 
way that commands greater legitimacy. Ethnicity, in 
other words, is respected for the twist that it brings  
in describing political outlooks and supporting 
political choices.
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Introduction
Fractured more today than for many years - possibly 
more fractured than ever before - Britain’s far 
right is in absolute disarray. If in 2010 the British 
National Party (BNP) had returned its best ever 
set of general election results, five years later, the 
BNP has foundered on the very same rock as its 
predecessors. Britain’s far right may have succeeded 
in winning representation to the European Parliament 
in 2009, but like the National Front before it, the 
BNP failed to navigate the more tortuous passage to 
Westminster. Left rudderless by unremitting internal 
strife (in 2014 Nick Griffin was finally ousted as leader 
and expelled), and buffeted both by the rise of UKIP 
and the headline-grabbing activities of the English 
Defence League (EDL), the BNP has now well and 
truly run aground. 
A miscellany of fragments has emerged from the 
wreckage. While history never quite repeats itself, 
parallels have inevitably been drawn with the 
fragmentation of the far right following the National 
Front’s abysmal showing in the 1979 general 
election. Recent developments have been watched 
with a combination of delight (particularly at Nick 
Griffin’s fall from grace) and concern. Some in the 
media have viewed the proliferation of far-right 
groups (over two dozen at my last count) as an 
indicator of far-right strength. If truth be told, this is 
more a marker of organisational weakness. Having 
said that, when electoral prospects are so bleak 
the proclivity of the far right towards combative 
and violent forms of direct action is probably more 
likely to increase than decrease (see Goodwin and 
Evans, 2012). Moreover, as groups vie for hegemony 
on the far right, some might be tempted to further 
radicalise as a way to carve out a distinctive identity. 
Reciprocal radicalisation between the far right and 
violent Islamism also remains a lingering possibility 
(even if the dynamics of this ‘cumulative extremism’ 
remain poorly understood).1 Fortunately one can only 
speculate but what might have happened had the 
six jihadists succeeded in exploding their homemade 
bomb at an EDL demonstration in Dewsbury in 
2012? What if a far-right group decides to gamble 
on more violent tactics against Muslim targets? And 
yet the horrific murder of Lee Rigby did not usher in 
a spiral of radicalisation (see Macklin and Busher, 
2015; Feldman and Littler, 2014). 
The same old story?
As I write, the outcome of the 2015 general election 
remains impossible to predict. Yet when it comes to 
the far right, one thing is absolutely certain: its impact 
at the ballot box will be negligible. So what more 
needs to be said? The story is an all too familiar one: 
Britain’s far right remains, or so it seems, historically 
irrelevant. Highly marginal, unimportant in terms of 
popular support and political significance, its history 
reads like a classic case of abject political failure. 
Britain’s largest far right organisation, the British 
Union of Fascists, did not even contest the 1935 
general election. That the BNP polled over 563,743 
votes in the 2010 general election, an increase of 
192,746 on their performance in 2005, should not 
blind us to the fact that no fewer than 267 of their 
candidates lost their deposits and their share of the 
national vote was a paltry 1.9 per cent.
The stock line is that British society, with its liberal 
traditions of tolerance and civility enjoys immunity to 
the right-extremist virus that is rarely found elsewhere. 
Something about ‘our history’ so the argument runs, 
makes Britons reluctant to embrace the fascist or far 
right. There is, as one anti-BNP campaign group had 
once put it, ‘Nothing British about the BNP’.2 But are 
‘British values’ so inherently benign?
There is a clear problem with overemphasising 
tolerance: we turn a blind eye to the racism that runs 
alongside it. So, we have been told by Nigel Farage, 
the hard-working Britons that once voted for the 
BNP, and now UKIP, are not ‘real’ right-wing racists 
but just decent folk concerned about ‘changes’ 
in their community, concerned about the scale of 
‘uncontrolled’ immigration. When these folk voted 
for the BNP they did so ‘holding their nose’ because 
they did not agree with the BNP’s racism.3 Yet aside 
from begging the question as to what a ‘real’ racist 
3. Britain’s Far Right and the 2015 
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is (?), and not wanting to blanket all UKIP voters as 
‘racist’, we will undoubtedly find racism amongst the 
votes that UKIP have stolen from the far right.
The obvious point to make is that racist expression in 
British society has not disappeared with the collapse 
of the BNP (or for that matter, the EDL). In March 
2014, in one of his self-congratulatory moments, 
Nigel Farage remarked that ‘I would think we have 
probably taken a third of the BNP vote directly from 
them, I don’t think anyone has done more, apart 
from Nick Griffin on Question Time, to damage the 
BNP than UKIP and I am quite proud of that.’4 But 
has Farage really challenged the racism that courses 
through the veins of some of his supporters? 
The bigger picture…
For sure, the far right is part of Britain’s national story. 
It will continue to be part of that national story even 
when voters abandon it, as they have recently done 
in their droves – almost 764,000 voters in the 2014 
European elections when compared to 2009. Of 
course election results count, but there is a much 
bigger picture, and yet it is one which we struggle 
to see (and no doubt the 2015 general election 
results will reinforce this myopia). So let us, for a 
moment, look beyond the ballot-box, and think about 
historicising the impact of Britain’s far right in its 
broader social and political context.
For a start, there is its impact on immigration control. 
Thatcher’s intervention in this area is one well-known 
example from the 1970s. There are others of course: 
the role of the British Brothers’ League in the 1905 
Aliens Act; or the role played by domestic fascists 
in the 1930s in deterring the British government 
from opening the door to ‘too many’ Jewish 
refugees; or the part played by local Immigrant 
Control Associations in encouraging the introduction 
of immigration controls in 1962. But it is not just 
in relation to immigration control where we see 
impact. We also encounter it in relation to legislation 
restricting fascist activity, such as public order 
legislation: the 1936 Public Order Act, for example, 
and subsequent amendments (in 1963 Section 5 
of the Public Order Act was strengthened following 
disturbances between fascists and anti-fascists). No 
fewer than 430,000 signatures had been collected by 
the anti-fascist Yellow Star Movement in 1962 calling 
for legislation against racial incitement. And after 
Labour came to office, a new offence of incitement 
to racial hatred was enacted under section 6 of the 
1965 Race Relations Act. Providing machinery by 
which appropriate legal steps could be taken against 
propaganda of the ‘Hitler was Right’ type formed part 
of the Home Secretary’s rationale.5
History does matter and it tells us that the far 
right has, at various moments, impacted on 
British politics and society. Beyond its effects on 
legislation, let us reflect on the everyday impact 
upon local communities: the Jewish community in 
London’s East End in the 1930s; its impact upon 
East London’s Bengali community in the 1970s; or 
more recent interventions in Oldham, Bradford and 
Burnley. What is the relationship between the far-right 
presence in such localities and the extent of racial 
violence? Also consider the impact of the far right 
in terms of the popular opposition that its activities 
have given rise to, from Cable Street in 1936 
through to Lewisham in 1977 and beyond. The 2015 
general election will no doubt bring further electoral 
reverses to Britain’s far right but there is much more 
to be said about Britain’s far right ‘fringe’ than its 
interminable inability to make a serious challenge for 
representation in Westminster.
Notes
1. For the most sophisticated conceptual treatment 
of ‘cumulative extremism’ to date, see Macklin 
and Busher (2014).
2. ‘Nothing British about the BNP’ was an online, 
centre-right campaign group.
3. See Nigel Farage’s comments when speaking in 
March 2014 at a debate at Chatham House.
4. Ibid.
5. See Cabinet Memorandum by Home Secretary, 
17 February 1965, available online at http://
filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-
129-120-c-23.pdf.
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Election 2015 looks set to be the closest, hardest 
fought and most unpredictable for a generation. 
Neither of the main two parties has a decisive 
advantage, while surging support for UKIP in England 
and the SNP in Scotland has changed the nature of 
the political competition. Much of the analysis of this 
close race focuses on the short term cut and thrust 
of politics – dissecting policy and messaging, and 
the strengths and weaknesses of leaders. While such 
things doubtless matter, there are other, longer term 
forces at work: changes in the composition, values 
and loyalties of the electorate which will impact on 
the competition in May, and well beyond. Some of 
the most important are the identity divides in the 
British electorate, which are playing an ever more 
significant role in driving voters’ political loyalties: 
the steady growth in Britain’s ethnic minority 
communities, the emergence of new immigrant 
minorities arriving as part of the largest wave of 
migration in British history, and the growing identity 
divide within the white majority population between 
those who embrace these changes and those who 
find them threatening. 
Race matters for party politics because white and 
non-white British voters behave very differently. All 
of Britain’s large ethnic minority communities have 
a much higher propensity to vote Labour than white 
voters do, and all tend to shun the Conservatives. As 
a result, the steady increase in the ethnic diversity of 
the electorate has important political consequences. 
Recent analysis by the think tank British Future has 
suggested that the Conservatives would have won a 
majority in 2010 if the electorate had the same ethnic 
mix as in 1992. The sharp rise in the ethnic diversity 
of London, Manchester, Birmingham and other large 
cities is an important driver of the long term decline 
in Conservative prospects in these areas. The big 
question for the Conservatives in 2015 is whether 
they can increase their appeal to ethnic minorities to 
neutralise the electoral cost of rising diversity. The big 
question for Labour is whether they can retain the 
loyalty of ethnic minority communities. Such loyalties 
were frayed by the last Labour government’s actions 
in Iraq and “the war on terror”, and research by the 
Ethnic Minority British Election Study team suggests 
that partisan attachments to Labour are much 
weaker among younger, second and third generation 
ethnic minority communities. 
Over the past decade or so, the long term rise in 
ethnic diversity triggered by the “first wave” of mass 
migration to Britain from the Commonwealth in the 
1950s and 1960s has been overlaid by a further 
shift driven by a “second wave” of mass migration. 
The growth in British migrant communities over 
the past two decades is the largest in the nation’s 
history, and the most diverse in its origins. Britain 
now has large and rapidly growing communities 
from Poland, Nigeria, Lithuania, China, and Somalia, 
joining the more established communities from 
the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent. The 
political impact of these communities in 2015 
depends heavily on where they come from. Migrants 
from Commonwealth countries have voting rights 
from arrival in Britain, and their rapid growth 
provides an important new electoral constituency, 
with distinctly liberal views on immigration, race 
relations and other issues. Migrants from many 
poorer non-Commonwealth countries such 
as Somalia or Iran also tend to acquire British 
citizenship at high rates, and so rapidly enter into 
the electorate. 
Migrants from the new EU member countries of 
Eastern Europe, however, do not. As a result, this 
group – who have formed the focus of intense and 
polarised political debate – have little political voice 
of their own. Less than 5% of Britain’s new Polish 
community will be eligible to vote in the 2015 election 
(though all are eligible to vote in local and European 
elections). This is likely to change over time, however. 
Migrants of all origins tend to acquire citizenship in 
growing numbers as they settle and form families 
– there is already evidence of an acceleration of 
citizenship grants to Polish migrants in recent Home 
Office statistics. The politics of the next Parliament 
may accelerate this – the growing demands for a 
referendum on Britain’s EU membership will increase 
anxieties among East European migrants that their 
rights to live and work in Britain may be under threat. 
This could encourage more to take British citizenship 
in order to protect the lives they have built here, 
bringing a new electorate with very distinct views 
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and experiences on the immigration issue into party 
politics for future elections. 
The unprecedented wave of migration to Britain 
since the mid-1990s has also helped to politicise 
a deepening value divide within the native born 
white majority, between “traditional nationalist” 
voters who oppose migration as a threat to British 
identity and a source of economic problems, and 
“confident cosmopolitan” voters who accept mass 
migration as a normal part of an outward looking 
society and a globally integrated economy. This 
divide is one of generation, education, class and 
values, splitting younger, middle class, socially liberal 
university graduates from older, working class, 
socially conservative voters who left school with few 
qualifications. A deep division in outlook between 
these groups has been visible in public opinion for 
many years, but the sharp rise in immigration, and 
the emergence of UKIP as the political voice of 
opposition to it, has greatly increased its relevance to 
political competition. 
This divide will be a key feature in the 2015 election. 
It cuts across the traditional issues of economics 
and public services that split Labour and Tory voters, 
and poses dilemmas for both. In an election as close 
as this, neither party can afford to lose “traditional 
nationalist” voters angry over immigration to UKIP.  
Yet short term appeals to such voters, through 
promises of swingeing cuts to immigration or 
action to restrict the social or political rights of 
migrants, carry their own risks. Parties who define 
themselves as hostile to immigrants and immigration 
will struggle to appeal in future to migrant and 
ethnic minority voters, who will distrust them. The 
Conservatives already paid this price with “first wave” 
migrants whose descendents still shun them today. 
Exclusionary rhetoric and restrictive policy risks 
alienating second wave migrants in the same fashion. 
Placing too much focus on migration and 
the anxieties of anti-immigration voters also 
risks alienating the growing young “confident 
cosmopolitan” electorate – socially liberal university 
graduates unconcerned by migration, who may 
perceive parties who place too much emphasis on 
the issue as intolerant and out of touch with their 
concerns. The recent surge in support for the Green 
party has come primarily from this group, who form 
the opposite end of the identity divide to UKIP. 
Identity divides new and old will force tough choices 
on all the mainstream parties in May 2015. The high 
electoral salience of immigration, and the rise of UKIP, 
creates a strong short term pressure to assuage 
the anxieties of older white “traditional nationalist” 
voters. Yet any party that adopts an overly restrictive 
and nationalistic stance on these issues could lose 
credibility with established ethnic minority voters, 
new migrant voters and the cosmopolitan young. 
Although right now all parties worry about appearing 
too soft on immigration, in the long run the greater 
risk may come from seeming too tough. 
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Much of the academic, media and political discourse 
in recent months has focussed on how the 
Conservative and Labour parties ought to respond 
to the electoral challenge posed by the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). At a series 
of conferences and workshops over the past year 
I have frequently heard it been suggested that the 
minute that ‘You start using the terms racist and 
racism they [UKIP voters] won’t listen to you, they’ll 
shut the door’, thus preventing any meaningful 
discussion of the ‘drivers’ of UKIP’s electoral 
support. Alongside this suggestion, it has also been 
argued that the last twenty years has proven that 
the strategy of condemning extreme right-wing and 
radical right-wing populist parties does not work. 
I want to look at the electoral challenge posed by 
UKIP in terms of what this might mean for those 
who are looking to oppose UKIP from an anti-racist 
standpoint. Below I highlight that some of the ways in 
which UKIP seek to deflect accusations of racism are 
hardly new. Moreover, it is suggested that we must 
grasp the forms of ‘race talk’ and the ways in which 
certain notions racism operate in the public sphere. 
Thus, highlighting the ways in which talk around 
racism is narrowed to the point where structural and 
systemic racism, as well as everyday and cultural 
racisms, are denied. Moreover, it is suggested that 
such denials further contribute to the entrenchment 
of racial inequality and white privilege.
Shortly after 9-11, the British National Party (BNP) 
approached representatives of different ethnic 
minority populations to form an ‘anti-Muslim front’ 
(Copsey, 2008). Alongside the party’s ‘Ethnic Liaison 
Committee’, this was a strategic attempt to deflect 
accusations of racism. Between 2002 and 2010, 
‘American Christian’, ‘Jewish’ and ‘Sikh’ supporters 
of the BNP regularly appeared on BNP leaflets 
expressing their ‘fears’ about ‘the Islamification’ 
of Britain. When the Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission rather belatedly challenged the party’s 
‘whites only’ policy, this had a direct impact on the 
BNP’s 2010 election campaigns. Just days before 
voters in Barking and Dagenham went to the polls, 
Pastor James Gitau, described as a Kenyan man 
living in Croydon, was presented to the media as 
a non-white BNP member in order to suggest that 
the party was not racist (TheNewsViddies, 2010). 
This stage-managed performance was followed 
up by Nick Griffin’s appearance on a Christian TV 
channel opposite black Pentecostal minister George 
Hargreaves, the Christian Party candidate for 
Barking (Histroika, 2010). The party followed this up 
with a leaflet of Griffin standing next to Hargreaves. 
The leaflet protested that the BNP did not want to 
‘persecute or hurt anyone of any race or religion’ 
but that immigration had been ‘unfair on everybody 
in Barking ...including West Indians and Sikhs, and 
even more recently arrived groups’. The leaflet also 
criticised Labour for encouraging the ‘spread of 
Islam’. Similar tactics have also been employed 
by the English Defence League, who have sought 
to deny that they or their supporters are racist by 
pointing towards their Jewish and Sikh ‘divisions’, 
who are said to be concerned that Islam represents 
a threat to Britain, while also being a symbol of the 
‘successful integration of other minorities  
into Britain’. 
UKIP also has a long history of Islamophobia (see 
Ford and Goodwin, 2014). In the wake of the 
killing of four Jewish people and twelve Charlie 
Hedbo employees in Paris in January 2015, Farage 
responded by declaring that ‘We do have, I’m 
afraid, I’m sad to say, a fifth column that is living 
within our own countries, that is utterly opposed to 
our values ... We’re going to have to be a lot braver 
and a lot more courageous in standing up for our 
Judeo-Christian culture’ (BBC, 2014a). These are 
well-versed tropes in Islamophobic forms of cultural 
racism in the post-9-11 era. Furthermore, Farage’s 
reference to Britain’s ‘Judeo-Christian culture’ may 
well be part of a deliberate attempt to distance 
UKIP from the anti-Semitism and extremism of 
parties such as the BNP and the French Front 
National (FN). That said, UKIP has recently put 
forward a policy that plans to outlaw the religious 
killing of animals. Whilst being another well-versed 
Islamophobic narrative, this policy has also been 
considered to be an attack on Jews living in Britain 
(Stevens, 2015; Sommers, 2015).
The BNP and UKIP have different organisational 
and ideological origins. UKIP does not have its 
ideological roots in fascism and Nazism, nor has it 
ever had a formal ‘whites only’ membership policy. 
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Despite previous discussions about an electoral pact 
with the BNP, Nigel Farage tried to maintain a clear 
distinction between UKIP and the ‘extremist’ BNP. 
Farage has also ruled out a pact with the French 
FN, claiming that the FN was a party of ‘prejudice 
and antisemitism’ (Mason, 2014). Such claims are 
undermined by the fact that prior to collapsing, 
UKIP’s Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
group in the European Parliament contained, 
amongst others, a Polish MEP renowned for making 
racist, sexist comments and raising questions about 
the holocaust (Syal, 2014).
Despite attempts to maintain a clear distinction 
between the party and extremism, ‘prejudice and 
antisemitism’, UKIP have openly courted what they 
call ‘decent’ BNP voters who ‘weren’t true BNP 
supporters at all’ (BBC, 2014b). In Barking and 
Dagenham, UKIP revived the themes of the BNP’s 
‘African’s for Essex’ campaign. In a letter to the local 
press in 2007, UKIP’s Kerry Smith wrote that:
The EU plan to open job centres at some 
employment agencies in north-west Africa [sic] ... 
If low-skilled African workers can come to the UK 
legally, where will they live? (Barking and Dagenham 
Post, 2007)
Smith is not the first UKIP member or election 
candidate to make such comments. Over the 
last year, UKIP election candidates have attacked 
Muslims and have even suggested that ‘if black 
people come to this country and don’t like mixing 
with white people why are they here? If he [Lenny 
Henry] wants a lot of black people around go and 
live in a black country’ (BBC, 2014c). When looking 
at these comments, there is one very obvious but 
important point that often gets overlooked: these 
individuals are, at least in part, attracted to UKIP 
precisely because of the anti-Black and Islamophobic 
racist campaigns and narratives outlined above – 
there is an attitudinal and ideological synchronism 
between UKIP’s campaigns and the views of their 
members and election candidates.
Appearing on The Andrew Marr Show on May 4th 
2014, Farage insisted that the party’s 2014 local 
election broadcast would highlight ‘black, minority 
ethnic candidates who are proudly standing for 
UKIP’ (Huffington Post UK, 2014). UKIP followed 
this up by holding a rally in London. During his 
speech, Farage dismissed the racist comments 
of UKIP members and election candidates as 
‘offensive’ and ‘idiotic’, defiantly claiming that these 
individuals are just a few rotten apples in the barrel, 
who ‘never have and they never will’ represent the 
view of the party (Ukipmedia, 2014).
I draw attention to this because the types of 
discursive and performative repertoires employed  
by UKIP and the BNP can have an impact on  
voting behaviour. This is evidenced in the  
following quotation: 
You know their getting a bad name because they’re 
racist and then I went to the hall to vote, one of 
them ..., the chairman of the local BNP, he’s married 
to a black girl ... And we’re getting it knocked into 
us that they’re racist ... Nick Griffin is supposed 
to be the most racist man in the world ... he was 
outside the hall and he was talking to the Indian fella 
and the coloured people that were walking in. 
When I carried ethnographic research in Barking 
and Dagenham between 2009 and 2010, I found 
that many BNP supporters did not think that their 
demand that ‘white Britons’ receive privileged and 
preferential access to scarce material resources to be 
racist. Racism was defined either as something that 
is intentional or as hatred towards black and Asian 
people; because they did not hate black and Asian 
people, they were not racist. Interestingly when Kerry 
Smith, formerly the party’s parliamentary candidate 
for South Basildon and East Thurrock, recently 
resigned after he was recorded mocking gay party 
members as ‘poofters’ and referring to someone as a 
‘Chinky bird’, part of Farage’s defence of Smith was 
that ‘I don’t think that in the comments he used he 
meant malice’ (Press Association, 2015). 
These discursive and performative repertoires, the 
political equivalent of the disclaimer, ‘I am not racist 
because I have black friends’, represent a challenge 
to those who are genuinely interested in halting 
UKIP’s electoral advances and challenging racism 
more broadly. These repertoires are part of wider 
processes of denial that frame racism as something 
‘extreme’, out of the ordinary and at times violent. 
In doing so, political parties and their supporters 
seek to position themselves as ordinary, normal 
and reasonable. At the same time, ‘race talk’ and 
racism is narrowed in such a way that structural and 
systemic racism, as well as everyday and cultural 
racisms, are denied, reducing racism to ‘seemingly 
benign discursive and representative mechanism[s]’ 
(Harries, forthcoming). Moreover, the experiences of 
ethnic minorities are overlooked: thus, denying both 
the cultural dominance and the broader entrenched 
nature of racial inequality and white privilege. 
Miri Song has recently argued that ‘We live in a time 
when our understandings and conceptualisations of 
racism are often highly imprecise, broad and used 
to describe a wide range of racialised phenomena’ 
(2014: 107). It seems to me that opposition to 
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parties such as UKIP cannot just be about exposing 
the racist, sexist and homophobic comments of 
party members, election candidates and elected 
officials. Moreover, rather than ‘parachuting’ into 
local communities to hand out leaflets with the words 
fascist, Nazi and racist written on it, more time and 
effort needs to be devoted to sustained community-
based, interventionist anti-racist work. This work 
must engage local civil society organisations in an 
attempt to promote an anti-racist ethos and inter-
ethnic solidarity. Central to this work is recognising 
and engaging the local politics of race, everyday 
forms of ‘race talk’, commonsense understandings 
of racism, how people read their local context and 
levels of racial inequality at both the national and local 
levels. A great deal has still to be done if a genuine 
anti-racist culture is to be established: that is, an 
anti-racist culture that recognises the multiple and 
contradictory ways in which ‘race talk’ and racism 
structures social relations and the role that this 
plays in reproducing white privilege and structural 
racism. This will be crucial if we are to challenge 
UKIP’s electoral advance and common sense 
understandings of racism.
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Ethnic minorities in Britain are substantially more 
religious than the white British population. This is 
not just the case for Muslims, whose religiosity gets 
discussed the most, but for other ethnic groups as 
well. Some minority ethnic identities are explicitly 
linked to religion, and again not just for Muslims: 
Sikhism is very much an ethno-religious identity. 
Apart from the more personal aspects of religiosity 
like identity, religion plays a very important role for 
ethnic minorities and will have an impact at the 
2015 Election. Religious involvement is one of the 
most important ways in which many minority groups 
participate in wider society and where they learn skills 
crucial for political participation. At election time, their 
places of worship are also an important source of 
reminders that voting is every citizen’s duty.
What we do in our communities, be it at a local level 
through clubs and societies through to politics and 
charity, or at a national level perhaps through signing 
Number 10 e- petitions or voting, helps create a 
cohesive, engaged and democratic society. For 
ethnic minorities in Britain, participating in religious 
events (including attending mass or other worship) is 
one of the main sources of community involvement. 
As Table 1 shows, the only civic activity that is more 
common than religious involvement, is voting. This 
is important, because as an extensive American 
study has demonstrated, these kinds of religious 
and social participation teach citizens skills that are 
useful for politics and make them more engaged 
citizens (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). In fact, these 
skills can be psychological. Using the Ethnic Minority 
British Election Study conducted at the 2010 General 
Election, we found that minorities who attended 
their places of worship regularly had more trust in 
political institutions such as the UK parliament and 
felt a greater sense of influence in British politics. For 
the minority groups who often have fewer political 
resources from other aspects of their social lives, 
the engagement in their local communities through 
a place of worship may mean a difference between 
voting and participating on the one hand and apathy 
and exclusion on the other.
Not all religions are equal, however, in terms of how 
much attention they pay to the political mobilisation 
of their faithful. Table 2 shows that the percentage 
of adherents encouraged to vote ahead of the last 
election in their places of worship varies substantially 
between different religions. Pentecostal churches 
are the most likely to deliver the message of voting 
to their worshippers as over half of our respondents 
who attended those churches said they heard a 
message of political mobilisation. Almost 40 per 
cent of our Sikh and Anglican respondents heard 
political encouragement in their Gurdwaras and 
churches. Around a third of Muslims, Catholics and 
other Christians heard political messages. However, 
the Hindu temples were very unlikely to deliver 
such messages: only 18 per cent of our Hindu 
respondents reported that their temples encouraged 
6. Religious Political Mobilisation 
of British Ethnic Minorities
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Table 1 Religion and participation in public life by ethnic minorities in Britain (%)
Anglican Catholic Pentecostal
Other 
Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim
Attending place of worship 
more than once a month
61 71 85 72 45 64 66
Voting in elections 72 63 72 61 67 79 70
Political participation (signing 
petitions, consumer politics, 
attending demonstrations, 
donating money)
43 32 40 33 26 35 31
Social participation (in social, 
cultural and sports clubs)
41 43 46 42 39 46 32
Number of respondents 
(unweighted) 120 206 257 258 234 164 1140
Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, results weighted to be nationally representative (Sobolewska et al 2015).
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them to vote. When we asked our respondents 
if they thought it was right that places of worship 
should do this, opinion was divided. Sixty-one 
percent of Hindus in our sample thought that the 
temples should keep out of politics entirely at the one 
extreme, while 44 per cent of Pentecostals thought 
church should be engaged in all political issues at 
the other. A subsequent YouGov poll shows that 
the general public is equally divided, with 45 per 
cent saying that religious leaders should express an 
opinion on political matters while 41 per cent thought 
they should keep out (YouGov, November 2013). 
Despite the importance of political engagement and 
mobilisation to vote, clearly not everyone agrees that 
religious institutions should play this role. 
Inevitably, the question that cannot be ignored is 
why the British ethnic minorities rely upon their 
places of worship to mobilise their vote. Given the 
uneasy place of religion in British politics, illustrated 
by the proportion of the public thinking that religious 
institutions should keep out of politics, the role of 
religion in political mobilisation may be questioned. 
Usually this role has been played by the political 
parties, but as Table 3 shows, the problem is that the 
minorities are not receiving as much contact from 
political parties as their white British counterparts. 
While 54 per cent of the white British respondents to 
the British Election Study in 2010 reported that they 
were contacted by at least one political party during 
the course of the 2010 electoral campaign, only 29 
per cent of ethnic minorities were contacted. Also, 
looking at the breakdown of which party contacted 
our respondents, it is clear that the white British 
people who were contacted were likely to hear from 
more than one political party; ethnic minorities by 
contrast were most likely to hear from Labour and 
virtually not at all from any of the smaller parties. 
Sobolewska et al (2013) showed that this is not due 
to ethnic minorities living in safer seats. 
Given that the level of political engagement among 
minorities is fairly high despite the dearth of 
mainstream political mobilisation from the political 
parties, it is not easy to overestimate the importance 
of the work done by places of worship. However, a 
question often raised – and one perhaps related to 
the general distrust of the political role of religion – is 
whether the religious leaders encourage the ‘right’ 
kind of participation. This is especially the case 
with British Muslims whose religious devoutness is 
generally treated with mistrust. Mosques are often 
portrayed as preaching extremism and encouraging 
separation from mainstream British society. A more 
detailed investigation into the relationship between 
attending a mosque and the type of participation it 
encourages shows that protest behaviour by Muslims 
is not encouraged by mosques. Instead, other 
non-religious predictors, such as the perception of 
prejudice and feeling of social distance from white 
people are more likely to lead to protest behaviour. 
Attending a mosque does not encourage these 
feelings and does not discourage social contact 
with non-Muslims or a sense of belonging to 
Britain (McAndrews and Sobolewska, 2015). As 
we saw earlier, it directly promotes political trust in 
mainstream political institutions. Thus the worries 
about places of worship mobilising an insular and 
extremist political activity seem unwarranted bar a 
few isolated exceptions. 
The importance of religious institutions to minorities’ 
political behaviour should be recognised and used to 
mobilise and engage minorities politically, but it also 
should serve as a warning sign to the political parties. 
Table 3 Percentage of British ethnic minorities who 
got contacted by a political party during the last 
general election campaign 2010.
White 
British
Ethnic 
minorities
Not contacted by any party 46 71 
Contacted by Labour 38 21 
Contacted by Conservatives 41 14 
Contacted by Liberal 
Democrats
34 12 
Contacted by Greens 6 1 
Contacted by UKIP 9 1 
Contacted by Respect 0 1
N 2643 2779 
Sources: BES 2010, EMBES 2010, weighted (Sobolewska  
et al 2013).
Notes: percentages do not sum to 100 since respondents could 
be contacted by more than one party. 
Table 2 Political encouragement by religion (weighted percentages)
Anglican Catholic Pentecostal
Other 
Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim
Respondent encouraged to 
vote by place of worship
37 29 56 30 18 38 32
N (unweighted) 120 206 257 258 234 164 1140
Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, results weighted to be nationally representative (Sobolewska et al 2015).
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Delegating the responsibility for political mobilisation 
to non-party organisations may result in more 
tenuous support for the parties among the religious 
communities and ultimately may not prevent a sense 
of disillusionment with what the mainstream political 
parties have to offer.
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The Census shows that 20% of the population of 
England and Wales, and 8% of Scotland, were not 
white British in 2011. The most recent estimates 
suggest that over 8% of the electorate are from an 
ethnic minority1 (Heath, 2013), in contrast to only 
4.2% of Westminster MPs. 
Prior to 2010, ethnic minority MPs were largely from 
the Labour Party, and mostly represented areas 
with higher proportions of ethnic minority voters. 
New minority MPs were often replacing retiring 
or defeated minority MPs, rather than white MPs. 
However, in 2010, these facts changed markedly. 
There was not only a large jump in the number of 
ethnic minority MPs elected from 16 to 27, but 
15 of these replaced white MPs. Moreover, the 
Conservative Party increased their number of minority 
MPs from 2 to 11. The ethnic composition of seats 
represented by ethnic minority MPs changed, largely 
as a result of these new Conservative MPs; 10 of 
the 11 Conservative minority MPs in Parliament 
at the moment represent constituencies where 
ethnic minorities comprise less than 10% of the 
population. In summary, the increase in minority 
MPs in 2010 was largely down to the Conservatives 
selecting minority MPs in safe seats with largely 
white populations (Sobolewska, 2013). This pattern 
looks set to continue; the Conservatives have 8 
ethnic minority candidates standing in seats where 
the sitting Conservative MP is retiring, compared 
to 2 in the equivalent situation for the Labour 
Party. Nevertheless, the number of ethnic minority 
candidates standing in winnable seats for Labour 
and Conservatives is roughly the same (Katwala and 
Ballinger, 2015).
There were 132 ethnic minority candidates 
standing from Labour, Conservative and the Liberal 
Democrats in 2010.7 Of these, the vast majority were 
of South Asian origin, but with comparatively few 
Bangladeshi candidates: 34 of 47 Labour minority 
candidates in 2010 were of South Asian descent, 
but only 5 of them Bangladeshi. Similarly, 30 of 44 
Conservative candidates were South Asian with only 
1 Bangladeshi candidate. This mirrors other socio-
economic trends, but there is a specifically political or 
perhaps demographic explanation: because South 
Asians tend to be more geographically clustered, it is 
easier to become a persuasive force in local parties 
to select a minority MP (Maxwell, 2012). Kinship 
networks may have played a part too. The Liberal 
Democrat experience underlines the importance 
of being selected for a winnable seat – though 
they elected no ethnic minority MP in the 2010-
15 parliament, the Liberal Democrats fielded 41 
unsuccessful minority candidates. There were also a 
substantial number of Muslim candidates – 55 from 
Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats 
combined, but very few Sikh candidates – 8 from 
these parties, of which 4 from Labour. 
Possible explanations for the low numbers of ethnic 
minority MPs and candidates are complex. Let’s start 
with those who select candidates. Party members 
often have more extreme views than people who do 
not join a party, and it is entirely plausible that some 
candidates face discrimination at this stage. David 
Lammy voiced concern after a number of minority 
councillors and candidates were deselected in wards 
that were vulnerable as a result of British National 
Party electoral activity. But maybe there aren’t as 
many ethnic minorities putting themselves forward 
to be selected – either due to disinterest in politics 
or the current party system, due to expectations 
of discrimination, or due to not fitting the expected 
profile of a future MP. After all, MPs are not 
representative of the rest of the country in a variety of 
ways – they are more likely to have gone to university 
and particularly Oxford or Cambridge, been lawyers, 
worked for existing MPs as Special Advisers, 
been local councilors, and to be middle class, to 
name just a few examples. If ethnic minorities are 
underrepresented in these groups, there will not be 
the same pipeline of potential minority candidates 
and MPs. This is indeed the case; in the Army, a 
popular route into politics for some, only 2.4% of 
officers come from ethnic minorities, as compared 
to 8.1% of other ranks. Only 5% of the senior civil 
service (Wood and Cracknell, 2013), and 6% of QCs 
come from ethnic minorities. Of course, none of this 
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is to say that our next MPs should be former lawyers, 
say, or Special Advisers.
Once an ethnic minority candidate has been 
selected to stand, research has focused on three 
main questions; whether white voters are prejudiced 
against them, whether ethnic minority voters are 
more inclined to support them, and whether they 
represent ethnic minority interests in Parliament once 
they get there. In 2010, ethnic minority candidates 
tended to attract lower vote shares. Research 
differs on whether this applied to all ethnic minority 
candidates, or only to some groups. One paper 
compared incumbent MPs who faced an ethnic 
minority challenger to those who didn’t, concluding 
that incumbent candidates did better when they 
faced an ethnic minority opponent – suggesting 
that some voters preferred to vote for a white 
candidate (Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets, 
2013). On average, the gain to the white incumbent 
candidate would have been just over 2 percentage 
points.3 Looking more closely at how individual 
voters behaved however, this figure is closer to 4 
percentage points, but mostly due to white voters 
with anti-immigrant feelings being reluctant to vote for 
Muslim candidates (Fisher et al, 2014). This is solid 
evidence that in 2010, ethnic minority parliamentary 
candidates faced an electoral penalty on account of 
their ethnicity. 
The picture is more mixed, however, when it comes 
to the question of whether ethnic minority candidates 
can expect an electoral bonus from voters who 
share their ethnicity. Research on the 2010 election 
shows that Pakistani candidates experienced an 8 
percentage point bonus from Pakistani voters (ibid), 
although perhaps only among Labour candidates 
(Martin, forthcoming). However, there is no evidence 
that other minority candidates benefitted in 2010 
from increased votes from minority voters. A simple 
reading of these results has unsettling implications 
for party strategy; if ethnic minority candidates 
tend to have an electoral disadvantage, and most 
do not receive an electoral bonus, then selecting a 
minority candidate may still be seen as a risk outside 
a safe seat. The response to this is firstly that the 
Conservatives showed last election that minority 
candidates can win in largely white seats, and 
secondly that ethnic minority candidates in seats with 
large minority populations may not always have an 
advantage, but might be better able to represent  
their constituents.
This leads us to the knotty question of whether 
ethnic minority MPs behave differently. One reason 
we care about whether parliament represents the 
true ethnic diversity of the population is that we 
think that politics would be better as result – the 
idea is that a greater diversity of experiences leads 
to better discussion, more ideas, and in the end, 
better representation of minority groups’ interests in 
politics, rather than the interests of people who are 
the majority in parliament – white, middle class men. 
In the UK, ethnic minority MPs do speak up more 
than their white counterparts on issues relating to the 
rights of ethnic minorities, immigration, and equality 
issues (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2013). This is despite 
a desire from some not to be seen as single-issue 
MPs (Nixon, 1998). Positively though, it is not just 
minority MPs who are interested in issues of equality; 
all MPs ask more questions about ethnic minority 
rights and equality issues if they have an ethnically 
diverse constituency (Saalfield, 2011). A word of 
caution however; this research looked at the pre-
UKIP era, and before Labour and the Conservatives 
became more exclusionary in an effort to minimize 
the damage done by UKIP. How ethnic minority MPs 
and candidates deal with this party will be one of the 
big challenges for minority political representation in 
the next parliament.
Notes
1. This figure excludes people of Chinese origin, 
referring only to people of Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, black Caribbean or black  
African origin.
2. Source: author’s own data
3. Of the three-major-party vote share
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Voting in elections is ordinarily viewed as the  
minimal way in which people participate in 
democracy as citizens. The declining turnout  
figures in British elections since 1945 are taken  
as a sign of a ‘democratic deficit’ while individuals 
who choose not to vote may be criticised for being 
less engaged citizens.
To vote in elections, individuals need to be registered. 
While many are aware that African Americans and 
other groups are less likely to be registered because 
of barriers to their registration in the United States, 
historically registration in the UK has not been viewed 
as a concern for equal democratic participation. Yet 
evidence suggests that while BME people in the UK 
are as likely to vote if they are registered to do so, 
they have typically been less likely to do so. Those 
who were registered voted as much as white British 
electors  (Ethnic Politics, 2013).
The change to individual electoral registration, 
discussed below, has led to some concern about 
the effects on BME voters. For the 2015 UK General 
Election the change to voting registration will not 
have a direct effect, as the electoral roll is based on 
previous rolls. However, as many as 20% of BME 
people (compared to 7% of white people) are already 
not registered even before these changes have been 
implemented.
likely to be unregistered. And although Black African 
people are more likely to be born overseas, the group 
with the second-highest rate of non-registration are 
people in the ‘Mixed’ ethnic category, people who 
are the most likely to be born in Britain.
These two groups reflect two of the main reasons 
why BME people are disproportionately under-
registered. The most common reason BME people 
cited is they believe they are not entitled to vote. 
Yet in the UK all citizens of the Commonwealth and 
Pakistan are entitled to vote, suggesting that many 
do not realise they are in fact entitled, a finding further 
supported by ‘I don’t know how to register’ being the 
fourth most common reason for non-registration.
The other main reason why people are not registered 
is because they have recently changed address. This 
is particularly relevant for Mixed people, who have the 
youngest age profile in the UK. While there has been 
some coverage of the effect of registration rules on 
young people and students, less have focused on the 
fact that over 20% of the 18-21 year old population is 
BME, meaning that any disenfranchisement of young 
people through under-registration will affect ethnic 
minorities disproportionately. 
Given that BME people are as likely to vote when 
they are registered, and that the main reasons for 
non-registration are lack of information or changes 
in residence, higher rates of BME non-registration 
should not be interpreted as greater political apathy. 
Yet a presumption of greater apathy is the only 
implied justification in the government’s initial white 
paper on individual voter registration. The further 
implication was that constituency boundaries could 
be legitimately redrawn in such a way as to exclude 
non-registered electors. If boundaries are drawn 
only to include registered voters as electors, that will 
increase constituency sizes where BME are more 
likely to live, diluting their voting power.
While this redrawing has been put on hold, and so 
the voting power of BME people thereby not further 
diminished, there remain concerns beyond 2015, 
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Group % not registered
White 7%
Pakistani 15%
Black Caribbean 16%
Bangladeshi 17%
Indian 18%
Mixed 22%
Black African 28%
Data: Ethnic Minority boost to British Election Study (EMBES) 
2010.
These figures show that all ethnic minority groups 
are at least twice as likely to be unregistered as white 
British people, with Black Africans 4 times more 
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when the full-scale roll out of individual electoral 
registration will require local authorities to do more 
actively to ensure people can vote. In an initial 
assessment of proposed changes to the electoral 
roll, the government accepted that ethnic minorities 
would be more likely fall off the register (Deputy 
Prime Minister, 2011). The Electoral Commission 
has also suggested that ethnic minorities would  
be disproportionately affected by an overall drop 
from 92% to around 60-65% (The Electoral 
Commission, 2011).
Shockingly, the government offers no argument 
for this disproportionate effect nor do they offer 
any mitigating policies to address it. If a foreign 
government were to adapt a similar change that 
affected people who strongly voted against that 
government (with 68% of BME voters supporting 
Labour in 2010 (Heath and Khan, 2012)), the Foreign 
Office would be voicing concerns about a sham 
democracy. While the changes in the law are to 
be welcomed, the boundary review has only been 
postponed, and there are still significant risks that 
BME people could be disenfranchised in the next 
(post-2015) election, as there are still no positive 
measures in place to improve registration rates.
The recent film Selma drew attention to the various 
ways in which local officials put up unreasonable 
barriers for African Americans to register to vote. 
Voting rights for ethnic minorities in Britain today  
are vastly more secure than those in Alabama  
50 years ago. Yet there is not enough awareness 
of the effects of impending changes to registration, 
nor is government doing enough to explain these or 
ensure local electoral registration officers effectively 
reach ethnic minority electors. The single biggest 
reason why ethnic minorities are under-registered 
is that they don’t realise they are entitled to vote, 
particularly those from Commonwealth countriesand 
the Republic of Ireland (Sobolewska and Heath, 
2014). To mitigate those effects, people will need 
further information and support to ensure they are 
registered. And if this information is not adequately 
provided, senior political leaders who have suggested 
that Commonwealth and Irish citizens should lose their 
votes (Pack, 2015) clearly will not ignore the issue.
Two other groups that will need further support are 
young people (previously registered by their parent, 
and disproportionately likely to be ethnic minorities), 
and women who may never have registered before 
due to their male ‘head of household’ registering 
for them – 1 in 6 ethnic minority women in 2010 
indicated someone else filled in the household 
registration form.
The case of Jim Crow laws and practices shows 
that formal rights need citizens’ empowerment and 
practical action by local democratic institutions to be 
realised. As Selma highlights, we also need to focus on 
practical policies and measures that hinder or promote 
abstract rights, an salutary lesson in this anniversary 
year of the Magna Carta and of the first race relations 
legislation in Britain (1965), neither of which have been 
able to deliver equal liberties for all, and especially 
Black and minority ethnic people. If even the right to 
vote – a right without which democracy can have no 
legitimacy – can be so atrophied, Selma shows how 
citizens can instead regain their rights and improve the 
quality of our democracy. 
The stakes in the UK may be lower, but the evidence 
suggests that central and local government are 
still not doing enough to ensure that formal rights 
for BME people are a reality, denying them their 
legitimate political voice, and damaging the nature of 
democracy for everyone.
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As we approach the 2015 General Election, BME 
electoral participation in Scotland will encounter 
similar challenges and opportunities as that of the 
rest of the UK. These include disproportionately 
lower levels of voter registration amongst some BME 
groups (EMILIE Research Project, 2009), a concern 
about satisfaction in electoral systems (Meer and 
Modood, 2009) and the issue of sufficient levels of 
ethnic minority representation (Uberoi, Meer and 
Modood, 2010). Yet Scotland offers an interesting 
case through which to explore BME political 
participation in the 2015 election because it is also 
characterised by three distinguishing features which 
make direct comparisons with rUK difficult. 
Firstly, and in many respects crucially, there is an 
astonishing lack of quantitative data collection on 
BME electoral participation in Scotland. This largely 
stems from the reliance on sample sizes that do 
not sufficiently take into account the smaller ethnic 
minority presence in Scotland (discussed below). 
A typical illustration is the routine ICM Electoral 
Commission surveys. For its winter 2013 poll, ICM 
interviewed a nationally representative quota of 1,203 
BME adults aged 18+ living in the UK of which just 
87 were living in Scotland (Electoral Commission, 
2013). This is also true of the 2010 British Election 
Study (BES) data which despite a bigger sample size 
of 2,631 (Wave 2), included only 6 people of Indian 
background in Scotland and 2 people of Pakistani 
background. Even using the data from the 2010 
Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) 
would not yield enough data for Scotland as the 
Ethnic Minority sample comes to 39 (Heath et al, 
2013). Seeking to extrapolate from these kinds of 
base figures would offer false precision and so we 
are not able to make meaningful predictions based 
upon existing quantitative data-sets. In understudying 
BME voters in Scotland, therefore, the possibility of 
BME electoral variation remains overlooked.
The second important difference is demographic. 
According to the 2011 Census, only 4% of people in 
Scotland are from minority ethnic groups (compared 
with around 12% in England). South Asians make 
up the largest minority ethnic group (3% of the total 
population or 141,000 people) compared with over 
6% in England. This modest number of the largest 
and most longstanding ‘visible’ ethnic minority is 
made apparent when set against the finding that 
1.2% (61,000) people record their ethnic group as 
‘White: Polish’ (a more recently arrived group). It is 
worth noting also how few African Caribbean groups 
there are in Scotland compared to the number 
of Chinese groups – an inversion of the trend in 
England. While the differing ethnic composition in 
Scotland is centrally relevant,1 part of the reason 
that direct comparisons of electoral participation 
are not easy is that unlike in England where there is 
some significant BME residential dispersal (across a 
variety of electoral wards outside the major centres) 
this is much less evident in Scotland. The electoral 
concentration of BME groups is significantly clustered 
in a handful of cities, namely Glasgow City where 
12 per cent of the population were from a minority 
ethnic group, in the City of Edinburgh and Aberdeen 
City it was 8 per cent and in Dundee City it was 
6 per cent. This means that of the 59 Scottish 
Westminster constituencies, the ethnic minority 
electorate are only visible in just 16 (5 in Edinburgh, 
7 in Glasgow, 2 in Aberdeen and 2 in Dundee). From 
these constituencies, only Glasgow Central has an 
ethnic minority population that is significant (around 
¼ of the population is non-white).2 Indeed, this is the 
only UK parliamentary constituency in Scotland that 
has been represented by a BME MP. Mohammed 
Sarwar who won this seat (then known as Glasgow 
Govan) in 1997 was the first Asian Muslim elected 
to the House of Commons (his son Anas Sarwar 
won the same seat in 2010). One in 59 is lower 
than the Westminster average of 1 in 43 BME 
Parliamentarians for the 2010 intake. 
Perhaps a starker illustration comes in the form of 
Local Government. Bashir Maan blazed a trail for 
all British ethnic minorities by getting elected to 
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represent Glasgow’s Kingston ward for Labour in 
1970 (Peace, 2015: 4). However, heading into the 
2012 Local Government elections, the Coalition for 
Racial Equality and Rights (CRER) report there were 
just 10 non-white Local Councillors from a total of 
1,222 across the country, representing 0.8% of the 
total. Over half of the elected BME Councillors in 
Scotland were in Glasgow, meaning that only 5 of 
Scotland’s 32 Local Authorities had minority ethnic 
representation. Of Scotland’s cities, Dundee was the 
only one other than Glasgow to have any minority 
ethnic Councillors, with the capital, Edinburgh, having 
no representatives (Coalition for Racial Equality and 
Rights, 2012: 6).
This leads more broadly to a third point concerning 
the question of political representation. The 
devolution settlement has added a layer of 
democratic representation and distinct opportunities 
for ethnic minority political participation. We see 
this in terms of both the seeking of office, taking 
part in elections and also the kinds of issues that 
become subject to political debate. So in addition 
to 59 Westminster constituencies and 32 council 
wards, the Scottish Parliament created 79 new 
constituencies plus 56 through additional member 
lists. Currently there are only 2 BME MSPs (Humza 
Yousaf for the SNP and Hanzala Malik for Labour - 
both representing Glasgow constituencies). 
Returning to Westminster, latest polling suggests 
that the SNP are set to gain the largest number of 
Scottish seats at the 2015 General Election.3 Ethnic 
minorities have traditionally been very loyal to Labour 
but this relationship already became strained with 
the decision to invade Iraq (Dobbernack, Meer 
and Modood, 2014). The SNP will be working very 
hard to persuade even more BME voters that their 
interests are best represented by the nationalists, 
irrespective of the way they voted in the 2014 
Independence Referendum. A marked feature of 
that campaign was the visible BME presence and 
participation, on both sides of the arguments. 
While the referendum analysis is still being 
undertaken, throughout the campaign anecdotal 
evidence suggested that BME voting intentions 
were consistent with the wider electorate, though 
what stood out most was that the Yes campaign 
had no less traction with ethnic minorities than 
the No campaign, and BME voices were at the 
forefront of both sides of the issue.4 This was true 
across all age ranges and markedly amongst young 
people who are typically viewed as less electorally 
engaged. In a study with a qualitative sample of 259 
ethnic minorities in Scotland, Arshad et al (2014: 
12) conclude that there was ‘no indication that 
there is any apathy among [BME] young voters’. 
One Electoral Commission study has however 
reported some disparity relating to the ease of 
access to information on the Scottish referendum. 
It specifically notes that ‘BMEs found it less easy 
to find information on how to cast their vote in the 
referendum (78% vs 91%), or on what would happen 
if there was a Yes vote (49% vs 60%) or a No vote 
(51% vs 64%) compared to the white Scottish 
electorate’ (Electoral Commission, 2014: 26). Despite 
the referendum result, the ‘Scottish question’ is 
not going away, yet the BME and constitutional 
issues appear to continue ‘to fire past each other’ 
(McCrone, 2002: 304).
The obvious point is that political participation is not 
simply about electoral participation but about the 
social and political field in which – in our case – BME 
groups in Scotland are confident and audible. In 
addition to the technical questions of participation 
therefore this has to do with a sense of ownership 
over what Scotland might be and become. In the 
words of the late Bashir Ahmed (Scotland’s first 
ethnic minority MSP – of the SNP) ‘it isn’t important 
where you come from, what matters is where we are 
going together as a nation’ (Salmond, 2009). Here 
there is a longstanding trend of self-identification 
and claims-making on Scottish identities by ethnic 
minorities (Hussain and Miller, 2006). The important 
aspect is the subjective confidence and willingness 
amongst minorities to stake such a claim. Yet it is not 
clear how stronger claims-making that come with this 
will be met. 
In a recent study of Scottish BME and national 
identity questions (Meer, 2015), it was noted that 
Scottish political actors frequently point to a number 
of boundaries for ensuring integration and pursuing 
unity. Two examples include the question of multi-
lingualism and multi-faithism. Taking the issue of 
language first, when the question is raised of bringing 
other minority languages into the fold, which are 
more frequently spoken than Gaelic and appear to 
be taking on distinctive Scottish forms in terms of 
content and dialect, there is a consensus amongst 
respondents that Scottish Urdu and Scottish Punjabi 
could not warrant a status as one of Scotland’s 
national languages. In this assessment, historical 
multilingualism is seen as a feature of the national 
identity whereas migrant languages are potentially 
fragmentary. A more charged illustration, however, 
concerns the prospects for religious pluralism, 
especially corporate recognition where the state-
church relationship is pluralised. There are some 
very good reasons to be cautious about seeking to 
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mirror one religious settlement in the present with 
something from the past, and it must be stressed 
that Scottish political actors were positive (often 
very positive) about the fact of religious pluralism in 
Scotland. What is interesting in their responses was 
that each framed the question of formally recognising 
religious pluralism – as opposed to the fact of 
religious pluralism – within a register of sectarianism, 
and therefore resisted it. This is one way in which 
‘countries with an inherited ethos of accommodation 
in relation to old minorities are not predestined to be 
inclusive of new minorities’ (Kymlicka, 2011: 289). 
When authors such as Hanif Kureshi and Salman 
Rushdie, and politicians including Diane Abbott and 
Bernie Grant, tackled Britishness in the 1980s they 
held a mirror up to white British society and asked: 
‘Who do you think you are?’ Today it would be 
impossible to think of the identity of Britain without 
placing minorities at its core. Something similar is yet 
to happen to Scottish identity, and political actors will 
play a vital role in these debates as they unfold.
Notes
1. For example, disproportionately high numbers 
of black African and black Caribbean minorities 
reside in social or rented housing which can lead 
to frequent movement and thus a requirement to 
continually re-register (a problem compounded 
by the recent move to individual registration). 
Conversely, there are disproportionately high 
levels of home ownership amongst some Asian 
and Chinese communities.
2. The total population of Glasgow Central at the 
time of the 2011 census was 91,257 of whom 
69,218 identified as white. The largest non-white 
group are Asian Scottish/Asian British. http://
www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk 
3. The Election Forecast UK website currently 
predicts that the SNP will win somewhere 
between 23 and 51 seats. http://electionforecast.
co.uk/ while the What Scotland Thinks/ScotCen 
Poll of Polls of voting intentions in Scotland 
for the 2015 UK general election has the SNP 
winning 49 seats http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.
org/2015/01/poll-polls-westminster-vote-
intentions-19-jan/ 
4. ‘I may be Muslim but I identify myself as 
Scottish’: the indyref battle for the Scottish 
Asian vote’, Herald Scotland, http://www.
heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/i-may-
be-muslim-but-i-identify-myself-as-scottish-the-
indyref-battle-for-the-scottish.23444359
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Appendix 2: Black and Minority 
Ethnic Demographic Change, 
2001-2021
In this report we have shown the past and present 
evidence on race and elections, including the 
experiences and attitudes of Black and minority 
ethnic (BME) voters. In this Appendix we outline the 
nature and extent of BME population growth in the 
UK Parliament’s 650 seats (659 in 2001) using 2001 
and 2011 Census data, and a projection for 2021, 
to indicate the relative salience of the issues raised 
in this volume. These data suggest that the impact 
of Black and minority voters will soon be just as 
important in the hundreds of ‘typical’ seats as in the 
highly diverse urban seats that usually attract political 
parties’ attention and the public imagination. 
Table 1 shows the BME proportion for the 650 
Westminster seats divided into fifths, or quintiles. 
Each quintile is 130 seats. The top quintile is for the 
130 seats with the greatest BME population, and the 
bottom quintile is for the 130 seats with the lowest 
BME population. In 2001, the top quintile of seats 
had a BME population of just over 10%. In 2011, 
the top quintile had a BME population of over 18%. 
We estimate that by 2021, the top fifth will all have 
a BME population of at least 25%. To put it another 
way, in 2001, only 57 seats had a BME population of 
25% or more. By 2021, at least 130 seats – a fifth of 
the total – are estimated to have a BME population of 
25% or more. 
The middle quintiles may be viewed as the more 
‘typical’ seats in Parliament. The second quintile 
of seats includes such a diverse range of seats 
as Thurrock, Swansea West, Cambridge, St 
Albans, Sheffield South East, Stoke-on-Trent 
Central, Gloucester, Wokingham and Bromley and 
Chislehurst. These seats have risen from a BME 
population of 4-10% in 2001 to 8-18% in 2011. We 
estimate all such seats will exceed 11% by 2021, 
with many reaching a BME population of 20-25%.
In 2001, the middle quintile of seats had a BME 
population of between 2-4%, thus meaning their 
ethnic minority residents had relatively little impact 
on voting or indeed on policy or public debate. By 
2011 this had risen to 4-8%, and the middle quintile 
seat will rise further still to 5-11% by 2021, or around 
the likely Liberal Democrat vote share in the 2015 
General Election. Together with the second quintile, 
these represent hundreds of seats where the ethnic 
minority vote may be more significant than the 
50-100 seats with very large BME populations but 
that generally remain safe for Labour parliamentary 
candidates. 
Historically there have been a large majority of seats 
with under 3% BME population. In 2001, the bottom 
40% of seats all had less than 2% BME population, 
but by 2011 this had risen to 3.4% and below, with 
only the bottom quintile under 2%. By 2021 we 
project that the bottom 40% will reach around 5% 
BME, the bottom quintile 3%, with only 40 seats – 
mainly in rural Scotland and Northern Ireland – having 
less than 2% BME residents.
Figure 1 further captures the increase in the BME 
population, as well as its increasing dispersal. This 
figure indicates deciles rather than quintiles, and 
again shows the increase between 2001, 2011 and 
2021 (projected).
The figure shows how the BME population has 
increased significantly in every kind of seat in the 
UK: from metropolitan London to rural Scotland. So 
while it is significant that the top 10% most diverse 
seats have increased from 22% to 33% BME over 
a decade (and will rise further to 44% by 2021), the 
increase in the middle deciles is equally notable.
Table 1. BME Proportion of UK Parliamentary seats, 
by quintile (2001-2021)
2001 
BME%
2011 
BME%
2021 BME% 
(projected)
Top quintile  
(1-130)
10.5%+ 18.4%+ 26.2%+
Second quintile 
(131-260)
4.1-10.4% 7.7-18.3% 11.3%-26.1%
Middle quintile 
(261-390)
1.9-4.0% 3.4-7.7% 4.9-11.2%
Fourth quintile 
(391-520) 
1.2-1.9% 2.1-3.4% 3.0-4.9%
Bottom quintile 
(521-650)
Under 
1.2%
Under 
2.1%
Under 3.0%
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Roughly a third of seats (the upper three deciles) had 
a BME population of 5% or more in 2001, while half 
of seats have reached that figure in 2011, and nearly 
two-thirds will pass that threshold in 2021. In 2001, 
only the top two deciles had a BME population over 
10%, whereas by 2021 twice as many constituencies 
(and 40% of the UK total) will have at least 1 in 10 
residents from a BME background.
The bottom decile includes all of the more rural and 
semi-rural seats in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, with only a few rural English seats. Here the 
change is somewhat more difficult to read but is still 
quite remarkable. While in 2001 there were areas 
where people would have almost no contact with 
Black and minority ethnic people, by 2021 even 
these areas will have BME populations of 2-3%. 
As these data indicate, when discussing and 
responding to ethnic minority voters, politicians 
and the wider public will have to move their focus 
beyond the very diverse seats such as East Ham, 
Birmingham Ladywood and Bradford West. Instead, 
the ethnic minority vote will be increasingly and 
perhaps even more significant in the hundreds of 
more ‘typical’ parliamentary seats such as Rugby, 
Rochester and Strood and Glasgow South. In 2021 
and beyond, non-white people may still be a minority, 
but their increasing population and dispersal will 
make it impossible for any party seeking to govern 
Britain to ignore their voices wherever they are 
standing for election.
A note on our projections
Our projections for 2021 assume a slightly lower 
rate of change between 2011 and 2021 than that 
between 2001 and 2011. The projection is based on 
the same overall increase in the BME population in 
each ranked constituency for the next 10 years as 
in the previous 10 years. For example, we assume 
that the overall increase in the BME population for 
the seat with the 200th largest BME population will 
be roughly the same from 2011-2021 (around 5,000 
more BME people) as it was from 2001-2011.
Figure 1. BME proportion of UK Parliamentary seats, by decile (2001-2021)
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